After  being  securely airborne for thirty years or   more,  a
gigantic,  stinking and   hideous  political chicken is coming
home  to roost at   terrifying speed. It has yet to settle  in
the  henhouse,  but the monstrous creature  beats  its  wings
with  ever increasing threat to clear its chosen  roost.  The
chicken is Eurofanaticism, the roost is Britain, the henhouse
is Europe.  Left undisturbed it will lay the eggs of EMU  and
universal  majority   voting.     Their  progeny  will  be a
Superstate destined within a generation to drive the whole of
Europe  to  the very continental war  which  the  emotionally
obtuse  supporters of full political  federation urge  us  to
believe  such a state will prevent.  For those  unwilling  to
purchase the Europhiles'    supranational fantasy there is but
one  important  question,   how may  a sane political  fox  be
placed in the henhouse to devour the megalomaniac bird?

For  the  first   time in a generation  our  ruling  class  is
sufficiently riven on Europe to give serious hope that  their
long  prevailing Europhilia may be overthrown.   It  is  true
that a majority of our   politicians still emit pro-EU  noises
of  one volume or another.   But as  ministers strut  with  an
ever  more  absurd   and   impotent  bombast  over  BSE,   our
fisheries and the working time directive,  our parliament  is
speedily  reduced to a democratic fig leaf designed to  cover
the  naked  ambitions of the Eurofederalists  and  a  foreign
court   persistently    breaches  British  sovereignty    with
politically  inspired abandon,   not only the politicians  but
all   Europhiles,   whether convinced or expedient,   know  in
their  hearts that the Eurofederalist game is up if only  we,
as  a  nation,  have   the courage  to  gainsay  the  received
political wisdom of the past twenty five years,  namely  that
Britain  can  only prosper,  indeed for  the  most  disturbed
Eurofanatics, only survive   within the EU.

This gainsaying is a matter of great urgency.  Even the  most
shamelessly  cynical    Eurofederalist  or  utterly  credulous
moderate Europhile - "we must support Europe,  but no further
moves to federalism should be made" - has ceased to trill the
tune of "no essential sovereignty has been surrendered". Such
nonsense stopped after the Maastricht debate.    The question
is not about whether we are moving too far or fast towards  a
federal Europe,  but whether we should be in the Union.  That
is our starkly simple choice.    Anyone who seriously believes
that perpetually limited federalism is possible flies in  the
face  of all historical experience, including that of the  EU
to date, which has moved inexorably from economic co-operation
to an already considerable   usurpation of national  political
authority.  Let  us   call such people  the  Eurogullibles  or
Eurogulls for short.

  The  outright federalists have now largely broken  cover  and
are  a clear enemy which may be fought on open  ground.  More
problematical (and dangerous) are those who argue that the EU
could  be reformed to allow   for members of widely  differing
status.  This  has   a specious attraction for  the  many  who
through  timidity  are   attracted to  any  compromise  simply
because it is a compromise.   (Such people should note that  a
compromise is by definition always second best.) The strength
and   utility  (for   the  federalists)  of  this   particular
emotional  barrier  to   political  sanity    should  not   be
uderestimated,   but    the  practicality   of  a   "variable
geometry" EU can objectively be given short shrift.

  An  EU  of   differing  memberships  would   go  against    the
intensely   federalist   and  statist  culture   of  both  the
elected     politicians   and,    even  more    vitally,    the
bureaucrats  who effectively control the EU whilst displaying
a  stupid disdain for the mass of their peoples  which  would
have  done  service   for  nobles of the  ancien  regime.  The
political   conviction     of   these   Eurofederalists      is
quasi-religious and   consequently  beyond the touch of reason
or refutation.  Worse,   they  have persuaded themselves  that
their  ends are  the ultimate moral and political   good  and
may be obtained by any means.    Nothing less than a political
revolution will prise them peaceably from their positions  of
power and influence.

Underpinning   this   emotional  commitment  to  the  European
"ideal"   are   the  basic  human  attributes   of   ambition,
self-aggrandisement and personal enrichment. These require no
elaboration.   Beyond them stand the legal and administrative
structures of the EU.

The existence of a large,    long  established,  well-paid and
lvishly funded    bureaucracy is  of itself a massive bulwark
against  change.  The   reality  of  the  EU  is  that  it  is
profoundly undemocratic. Those with experience of the British
civil  service will recognise the power which civil  servants
can  wield through a mixture of duplicity and the  incapacity
of  politicians.  But British civil servants,  for all  their
other  faults,   are    not  overtly  political  appointments.
Moreover, they are not politicians in their own right. The EU
employs  as a matter of course   politicians  in  its  highest
bureaucratic posts and even the European Court of Justice has
a  fair sprinkling of politicos. The consequences of  such  a
oliticised bureaucracy are profound.  Even if a majority  of
elected  EU  politicians   wished to change course  towards  a
less intrusive confederation,   they would experience  immense
difficulty    in   overcoming  the   deliberate   bureaucratic
subversion which would follow as night follows day.  In fact,
the only means of preventing such subversion would be to sack
every EU civil servant,  a practical impossibility if the  EU
was to continue in any form.

  The  primary  engine   of federalism to date  is  the  'Single
Market'.  It  is  so   because  it  exists  not  merely  as  a
facilitator  of  free trade (of itself a powerful  agent  for
undermining  national power),    but as a tool of  social  and
political   change    (free  movement  in  search   of   work,
equalisation of working practices etc.) Without the   'Single
Market'  the opportunities for EU interference and, even more
importantly,   for   the employment of  bureaucrats  would  be
much reduced. (The latter is important because no bureaucrats
quals no bureaucratic action). Moreover, the 'Single Market'
is used  as a lever towards other forms of integration  which
have  serious    economic  consequences but  which  cannot  be
reasonably  considered as part of the necessary  measures  to
ensure  a "Single Market".  Prime examples of  this  practice
are Health and Safety measures which can include,  as Britain
has   just    discovered  to  her  great  cost   and    immense
Conservative  dismay,    restrictions on one  of  the  primary
terms of employment, namely hours worked.

The question is,  as Lenin asked in not altogether  different
general political circumstances (for the EU read the  Tsarist
Empire),  what is to be done? A referendum is not the  answer
to our dilemma.  I am not opposed to referenda as a matter of
principle,  indeed I believe them to be a necessary mechanism
of  democracy.  But democracy also requires that no  decision
made by an electorate  be irreversible,  either in  principle
or practice.  Make irreversible decisions and the opportunity
for democratic action  no longer exists.   There is no formal
mechanism  within  the Treaty of Rome which provides  for   a
country  to  leave the EU. That is democratic  reason  enough
for disengagement. 

There is also a first rate practical reason why  irreversible
political  decisions should not be made.  There is  something
inherently dangerous in  the idea that a people at one moment
in  time can make a decision which shall be binding  for  all
time,  because material circumstances and political  opinions
can  change utterly and with immense speed.   The epitome  of
this in the EU  debate may be found in Margaret Thatcher, who
supported   our    initial  membership  and   argued   against
withdrawal during the 1975 referendum.

  To these objections may be added two others. The first is the
impossibility  in present circumstances of any referendum  on
Europe  being  conducted with a semblance  of  fairness.  The
front benches of both major parties are committed to  arguing
a particular line during any referendum. If the referendum is
on EMU, both will almost certainly support entry. If it is on
our  continued membership,   both will support  our  continued
membership.  Add to that the overwhelming pro-EU bias  within
the  media  -  no national newspaper has  as  yet  taken  our
withdrawal from the EU as its editorial stance - the  finance
available  through big business to the pro-EU lobby  and  the
political Europhile control of what question would go on  the
ballot paper,  and  any vote becomes more or less a formality
for continued EU membership. 

  But  even  if  a   referendum  decision  was  for  withdrawal,
profound  political   damage would be done because   it  would
give  a  spurious legitimacy to the idea that  referenda  can
ermanently  alienate sovereignty.  The use of  a  referendum
would  not,  of   course,  make the  concept   of  permanently
alienated sovereignty   constitutionally right or  practically
possible,  but it would provide a strong  emotional  argument
for  any party wishing in the future to either defend a  loss
of sovereignty already sustained or propose a further loss of
sovereignty.

  The  constitutional    position  on  perpetual  alienation  of
sovereignty  is  clear.   No parliament   has  the  power   to
alienate  in  perpetuity Britain's sovereignty,  for  if  the
British Constitution has one overriding principle it is  that
no  parliament can bind another. That is but  a  commonplace.
More fundamentally,    such an alienation cannot logically  or
practically   be made   whilst free national elections  exist.
This  is   so    because in such  circumstances   nothing  can
prevent  a  party   standing on a  platform  calling  for  the
amendment  or  complete repudiation of the  Treaty  of  Rome,
however amended that document may be.  In fact,   no statute,
treaty  or institution   can  be sacrosanct under an  elective
system  of  government,   not even where there  is  a  written
constitution and an interpretative constitutional court,  for
a  party  may still stand on a platform which states  that  a
change will be made regardless of what the constitution, laws
and  treaties  decree,    and  make  of  electoral  success  a
legitimate mandate.  By extension, the same argument  obtains
for decisions made by referenda.


  As things now stand  a country could practically secede  from
the EU by simply declaring its independence.  It could  leave
because  the  actual   control of all aspects of government is
still  within  the   grasp of the  individual  nation  states,
although it is true that some countries would experience much
greater difficulty than others if they were to leave the  EU.
The  smaller states would struggle  because  their  economies
are tiny  and  less economically diversified,  and thus  more
vulnerable to both relatively small changes in the balance of
trade and structural employment; those states receiving large
net  payments from the other EU members would  discover  that
they  are living wildly   beyond  their natural  means,  while
countries  such  as   Belgium  are  so  integrated  into   the
economies  of  their neighbours that  they  could  experience
something of the difficulties now   afflicting the  peripheral
constituents   of   the old Soviet Union.   However,  none  of
these  objections applies to Britain which is,  in EU  terms,
large,  economically diversified and with   an  exceptionally
wide variety of trading partners. We also have as a legacy of
the   last  World   War   and  our  imperial   past,   unusual
international   influence   through  our  membership  of   the
controlling  councils of   such bodies as the  UN,  the  World
Bank  and  the IMF.    To these advantages  may be  added  the
general  protection given by GATT against the  imposition  of
unfair  trading   practices.  As things stand  Britain  could,
prima facie,  leave the EU without much difficulty, either in
terms  of  present practicality or fear  of  future  economic
reprisals.

  Conditions  might,  of   course,   change  radically.   It  is
conceivable that Britain outside the EU could be faced with a
protectionist  EU which   formally  repudiated all or part  of
GATT  or  which simply refused to abide by  either  the  GATT
rules or  GATT judgements. But GATT may in any case fall foul
of  a general world-wide revulsion against the effects of  low
tariff  or  no   tariff international   trade.  Moreover,    a
Britain  within  the   EU could well find  itself  part  of  a
protectionist trading block. In other words,  whatever course
we  choose  has economic dangers.  What we do know  from  our
experience to date  and   the  commitments made at Maastricht,
is  that  to remain within the EU will result  in   our  ever
greater  political   subordination,   a  growing  transfer  of
British taxpayers' money to   subsidise our poorer competitors
in the EU,  a continuation of the CAP and CFP and a flood  of
costly and irksome regulations.

  But  if we can remove ourselves practically from the EU  now,
the same will not be true in ten,   perhaps even five,   years
time.   The  extent to which membership of  EMU  would   bind
Britain  into  the   EU cannot be  overstated,  for  it  would
provide  the  means   for  others  to  not  only  control  our
economy,  but to bludgeon us by a mixture of carrot and stick
into  the acceptance of ever more federalist measures - "  Of
course  we'll let you run a bigger budget deficit this  year.
Now about this question of an EU army."

But  even without EMU the future is bleak for those with  any
desire  to remain living in   a nation state.  The  Maastricht
treaty contains the seeds for supranational decisions on  all
the   important   political  matters:    currency,   taxation,
interest rates, credit controls, defence,  policing,  foreign
policy,  social   security, education,  commerce/industry  and
immigration.   It   is not fanciful to imagine that in  a  few
years the EU will be demanding a say in such matters as  what
taxes  are  to  be raised and the control of  the  armed  and
police forces.

  What  is  ideally   required to save Britain is  a  two  party
system in which both parties are prudently nationalist,  that
is they attend to Britain's obvious interests without lapsing
into vulgar chauvinism. (Those who make a distinction between
nationalism and patriotism are simply distinguishing  between
aggressive  and non-aggressive nationalism).   Within such  a
general  constraint  a meaningful  party divide  could  exist
based  on  those   matters which are  the  eternal  truths  of
politics:  free  trade versus  protectionism,  libertarianism
ersus traditional paternalism and traditional  international
involvement   (mutual   defence  treaties,   bilateral   trade
agreements  etc)  versus neutrality.  It does not  follow  of
course  that  two   neat  triads would  form  with  one  party
espousing   free   trade,  libertarianism  and   international
involvement  and    the other protectionism,  paternalism  and
neutrality.  Nor would it   mean that one of the parties could
not   be  socialist    for  socialism  is   only   necessarily
internationalist  in  the   Marxist  tradition  (and  scarcely
that since Stalin's time).

More  problematical is the question of how such  a  political
revolution  could be achieved.    It  seems improbable that  a
new  party with a realistic chance of power could be  created
in  less  than a generation (and that is  being  optimistic),
unless  there is a genuine break in the Tory party with  both
considerable numbers of  rank and file MPs and ministers  and
ex-ministers  defecting.   Perhaps one hundred such  defectors
would  give  a new party a chance.  But even then  the  whole
electoral system would be grotesquely weighted against  them,
from  the  absence   of a party  bureaucracy  through  limited
access to the various mass media to shortage of funds.

It  is  possible that some cataclysmic social  upheaval,  for
example a sudden unmanageable influx of immigrants (from Hong
Kong say),  overweening interference by the EU - for example,
conscription  for a European army or taxes  imposed  directly
and overtly by Brussels - or extreme material distress  might
loosen  the political system sufficiently to catapult  a  new
nationalist  party to power,   but that is improbable even  in
such   extreme   circumstances.   More  likely  would   be    a
fragmentation of political support within the old parties and
the  new,   or   the  immediately   successful  assumption  of
particular  practical nationalist measures by one of the  old
parties  without  an admission of the need for   a  generally
nationalist   stance.    And  that  assumes  no   proportional
representation,  a   dangerous assumption if Labour  form  the
next   government    with  the  aid  of  the   LibDems.    With
proportional  representation   the  business  of   extricating
Britain from the EU might well become impossible.
The  best hope is to remake the Tory party.  This  would  not
necessarily be forbiddingly difficult because the Tory  Party
has  been,  and  I   believe at  heart  still  is,  inherently
nationalist.  The   flirtation with Europe is  an  aberration.
Whether  such a change   can be made without the  party  going
out of power is unlikely.   Even if the present leadership was
removed,  it is doubtful if the party could be  persuaded  at
the  present time to do more than reject EMU and having  done
that  there  would   be,  if power  was  retained,  a  massive
temptation to say the boat had been rocked enough.

The  immediate requirement is for  a serious political  voice
constantly  reminding   the  public  that  the  EU  is  not  a
necessary  or inevitable part of the political landscape  and
that  both   constitutionally  and  practically,   sovereignty
annot be permanently alienated. An unambiguous anti-European
message   also  has   practical  propaganda  advantages.   The
indeterminate  position adopted publicly  by all  Eurosceptic
MPs  places them at a grave disadvantage.  The public  cannot
identify strongly with people who, on the one hand, extol the
notional virtues  of the "single market"  and seem to preface
every speech or interview with professions that they are  not
anti-European,  and on the other,  decry Maastricht  and  the
existing iniquities of the various Community institutions.  A
clear  rejection of the formal European embrace is  necessary
before  the political sewage of the past quarter century  can
be safely processed.

The  other  great propaganda lack is the absence of  a  clear
delineation  of  the disadvantages which Britain  is  already
suffering and may suffer in the future.  What is required  is
an  easily  accessible   booklet to alert the  public  to  the
practical  effects and implications of EU membership.  It  is
especially  important to make people realise how their  lives
will be altered as power moves away from Westminster.  Up  to
the present,  the EU has not impinged greatly on the life  of
the ordinary citizen. Absurd industrial and trade regulations
may  not cause widespread discontent. It will be a  different
matter  if conscription for a European Army is introduced  or
really  substantial  tax   and  social  security  contribution
increases occur at the behest of Brussels.

  If  one EU abomination for is to be singled out  for  regular
public  consumption,  let it be the one that  every  man  and
woman  in Britain may understand: this year Britain  will  be
giving,   yes   giving,  approximately  4  billion  pounds  of
taxpayers  money to other EU members,  all of which  are  our
trading competitors.  Speaking plainly,  this is a tax levied
by Brussels.   Would any party be willing to openly stand for
election on such a platform? If this is our treatment when we
still have the legal right to assert  our national  interests
in most political areas, it is certain that closer federation
will  result in much more dramatic measures  to  disadvantage
Britain.

Our  EU membership has shown exactly what Britain may  expect
from a federal Europe.  Since joining,  Britain has  incurred
the  cost  of   supporting the CAP,  the  EU  bureaucracy  and
parliament, seen our fishing grounds massively infiltrated by
foreigners,  allowed foreign politicians, the Commission  and
the  European Court of Justice   to persistently interfere  in
British life,  adopted disadvantageous EU laws and Commission
edicts without effective protest,    been forced to  massively
subsidise  other EU states and has developed a massive  trade
deficit  with  the    EU.  In  addition,   Britain  has   lost
important  trading   privileges with the old Dominions and, in
the process,  has   largely destroyed  a valuable  sentimental
relationship with those   nations. Perhaps most importantly in
the long run, we have effectively lost control of immigration
because of our treaty obligation to free movement within  the
EU and the risibly   weak frontier controls operated by other
EU members.

Of  all political truisms the most certain is that  power  is
never  willingly ceded.   This is so   because  politics  like
economics  has  a natural tendency to monopoly.  There  is  a
single  political commodity:   power, which is  the  political
equivalent  of  money.   Politicians of all  stamps   seek  to
corner power, because only by doing so can a political agenda
be perfectly executed. This is true whether or not an  agenda
is for more or less state control,   because to ensure  either
it is necessary to be in government,  that is  to  monopolise
power.  The bleak truth is that for as long as the EU exists,
one  might  as  well try to stop an inflowing   tide  with  a
colander  as  prevent the movement to a federal  Europe,  and
that  applies  regardless   of  whether  Maastricht  is  fully
implemented  by  1999.    Maastricht   merely  quickened   the
sociological process. 

  It  is  vitally important to realise why Britain  is  utterly
unsuited to the EU.  The frequent arguments  between  Britain
and   the  other   EU  members  are  commonly  attributed   by
Europhiles  to  cultural differences and  varying  historical
experiences.   These arguments will not wash because in  both
matters  the continental EU members differ as much  from  one
another  as  they   do  from Britain.   There  are  two   more
plausible primary causes, Britain's singular history and what
is  tantamount  to bribery,  namely the  payment  of  massive
subsidies to  nations such as Ireland and Greece. 

  Because  of our history,     all EU members,  at least at  the
level of the political class,   have strong historical reasons
to wish  Britain harm.   The French, Spanish and Dutch harbour
very old and profound historical resentments against Britain,
not  the least of which is the thwarting of their  own  plans
for  political  and   commercial  supremacy  in  Europe,   the
Germans  bear the pain of the loss of two world wars and  all
but Sweden, Spain and Portugal suffered defeat and occupation
during  or after the last world war and resent the fact  that
Britain  did not.  The Irish position needs  no  elaboration.
Britain, on the other hand, has been generally victorious  in
the  past  three   hundred years  and,  moreover,   enjoyed  a
century  or  more   of  commercial,  industrial  and  imperial
supremacy.  The result of such disparate pasts is  a  general
resentment  of past   English and British  successes,  coupled
with  a  sense of shame at specific  national   humiliations,
whether  inflicted by Britain or not.  This is surely one  of
the   primary   reasons for  Britain's  remarkably  consistent
failure to obtain support within the EU, whether it be in the
Council of Ministers, the Commission or the European Court of
Justice.

That we should have placed ourselves into the hands of people
with such profound  grudges is barely credible.  Indeed,   on
that  ground  alone   it  is  difficult  to  see  how  British
politicians  could  ever have rationally concluded  that  the
country would not suffer gravely from her membership. When we
add the open buying of support, through  direct subsidies and
trading  advantages  such   as the  CFP,  for  policies  which
penalise  Britain,  our membership becomes  truly  fantastic.
Cynics  might object that because  Britain is one of the  two
biggest  net   contributors,  she could use her money  to  buy
support.  However,    this argument does not carry much weight
since the Single European Act and Maastricht because so  much
is now done outside the British veto. Most importantly,   the
largest  EU states invariably produce a majority against  the
British  interest.     Germany and France work together  as  a
matter of course,  while   Spain and Italy both do very nicely
out of EU subsidies. Britain could, of course,  refuse to pay
subsidies, but that would breach our treaty obligations.  Our
present  subordination does not of course excuse the  failure
of  British  governments before the Single  European  Act  to
fight for British interests or the acceptance of either  that
Act or Maastricht. Nor, it must be said, has the British veto
been used recently when it might have been.

The Eurofederalist cause will succeed only if their immediate
agenda  is completed soon,   that is the joining of  a  single
currency followed shortly by   British agreement to  wholesale
majority voting in all the most vital matters of  nationhood.
If they fail to achieve these aims within the next five years
Britain will not become enmeshed in a federal Europe  because
not merely public opinion,   but the opinion of our  Political
Class is turning against the EU as the realities of not being
one's own national master become daily  more apparent.  If we
act now the danger can be averted.   But before we can act  we
must  smoke out of the   psychological  hobgoblins lurking  in
the   Eurofederalist   shadows,   the  demons  of   ignorance,
deference and timidity of character.  Many  Britons simply do
not  know what to believe about Britain's  prospects  outside
the  EU  and  as a consequence operate on  the  principle  of
'hold  tight to nurse for fear of something  worse'.   Others
honour  the age old practice of "aping   their  betters"  and
assume  Europhile clothes simply because  their ruling  elite
flaunts  the outrageous garb.   It is utterly necessary   that
those  politicians not entwined within the Eurofanatic  coils
give an unambiguous and vigorous lead to the people.

  A number of questions nag away at my brain:  what has Britain
gained  from EU membership to date?  What can they gain  from
membership  in the future? Where is the political mandate for
what   is   now   happening  to  British   sovereignty?   Most
importantly,  in  the   absence of  any  promise  to  withdraw
Britain  from the EU by either of the two  political  parties
with a chance of  power in Britain,  what peaceful and lawful
action  is left to those who see this destruction of  Britain
as  an  independent power as no more or less  than  the  most
profound act of treason?   After fifty solid years of  liberal
internationalist propaganda,   the word treason has an antique
ring for many people,  but what else can one call the removal
of   powers  from   the  British  people  by  politicians  who
simultaneously  tell   their  electorate  that  no   important
sovereignty is being ceded?

It is better to be a poor free man than a comfortable  slave,
for a slave lives always at the whim of his master.  That  is
one of the hardest truths for any human being to accept,  but
it is a profound truth nonetheless.    If we remain within the
EU,  we shall become the subjects  of those  with  historical
cause to hate and resent us.   The federalist movement may  be
utterly  broken:  it   cannot be parked   permanently  in  the
middle of the political road.   To adapt the words of the John
Dunning,   The influence   of the EU in Britain has increased,
is increasing and ought to be abolished.

Robert Henderson  
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